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Abstract
The effective conduct of monetary policy is complicated by uncertainty about the level of
potential output, and thus about the size of the monetary policy response that would be sufﬁcient
to achieve the targeted inﬂation rate. One possible response to such uncertainty is for the
monetary authority to “probe,” interpreted here as actively using its policy response to learn about
the level of potential output.
Monetary authorities have put signiﬁcant emphasis in recent years on attaining credibility
for their policy objectives. These steps have anchored inﬂation expectations to the target of the
monetary authority more ﬁrmly. I consider a simple calibrated model in the Canadian context and
examine the relationship between credibility and optimal probing.
I ﬁnd that, for plausible parameter values, the optimal amount of probing is small and
varies little with credibility. Only for low levels of credibility or unrealistically large levels of
uncertainty or volatility does the optimal policy with probing diverge signiﬁcantly from a policy
that ignores learning. Even then, the optimal amount of probing diminishes as credibility rises.
JEL classiﬁcation:  E52, E58
Bank classiﬁcation: Credibility; Potential output; Uncertainty and monetary policy
Résumé
L’incertitude qui entoure le niveau de la production potentielle entrave l’efﬁcacité de la politique
monétaire car elle rend plus difﬁcile la détermination du degré de resserrement nécessaire à la
réalisation de la cible d’inﬂation visée. Face à l’incertitude, les autorités monétaires peuvent
choisir de procéder par « tâtonnement », c’est-à-dire en tirant parti de leurs interventions pour se
renseigner sur le niveau de la production potentielle.
Depuis quelques années, les autorités monétaires ont déployé beaucoup d’efforts en vue
d’établir la crédibilité de leurs objectifs. Elles ont ainsi pu arrimer plus fermement à la cible visée
les attentes en matière d’inﬂation. L’auteur fait appel à un modèle simple, étalonné en fonction
des données canadiennes, pour examiner la relation entre la crédibilité et le degré optimal de
tâtonnement.
Il constate que, pour des valeurs plausibles des paramètres, le degré optimal de
tâtonnement est minime et varie peu selon la crédibilité. Ce n’est que lorsque cette dernière est
faible ou que l’incertitude ou la volatilité atteint des niveaux tout à fait irréalistes que la politique
optimale avec tâtonnement diffère sensiblement d’une politique qui ne repose pas survi
l’apprentissage. Même alors, le degré optimal de tâtonnement s’amenuise à mesure que la
crédibilité augmente.
Classiﬁcation JEL :   E52, E58
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Crédibilité; Incertitude et politique monétaire; Production
potentielle1
A credible inﬂation target can help the Bank probe to ﬁnd out what the
limits of potential output really are.
Gordon G. Thiessen, Governor of the Bank of Canada, 1998. “The Canadian Experience
with Targets for Inﬂation Control,” Canadian Public Policy 24(4): 423.
Although no one knows exactly where the NAIRU is ... in testing the waters,
we do not risk drowning. If need be, we can always reverse course. But by
experimenting, and showing some hesitation about restraining the economy
through higher interest rates or other methods as the NAIRU draws nigh,
we might learn a little more about the depth of the waters and possibly
become better swimmers in the process.
Joseph Stiglitz, 1997. “Reﬂections on the Natural Rate Hypothesis,” Journal of Economic
Perspectives 11(1): 10.
Although a closing of the output gap during the course of the next year
cannot be excluded, given the uncertainties surrounding this measure
monetary authorities should probe to see whether the economy can reach
higher levels of output without inﬂation pressures.
“Developments in Individual OECD Countries: Canada,” OECD Economic Outlook (June
1999): 65.2
1. Introduction
The effective conduct of monetary policy is complicated by uncertainty. There are many
dimensions to this uncertainty: uncertainty about shocks, model parameters, data, and the
“correct” model of the economy itself.1 At a practical level, one of the key uncertainties
facingpolicy-makersisthelevelofoutputthatcanbemaintainedwithoutaddingtoinﬂation
pressures (referred to as the level of potential output). While policy-makers can continue to
reﬁne and improve the measurement of potential output,2 to a considerable degree
uncertainty about potential output is fundamental. Thus, the challenge for policy-makers is
how todeal withthis uncertainty.
Three possible responses by the monetary authority to uncertainty about potential
output that have been examined analytically are to (i) ignore the uncertainty and follow the
“certainty equivalent” policy; (ii) act “conservatively,” by which is meant moving interest
rates by less than is implied by the certainty equivalent policy; or (iii) “probe” or
experiment, which implies that the monetary authority actively uses its policy response to
learn about the level ofpotential output.
Toformalizeprobingwithinaneconomicmodel,onemustunderstandwhatitmeans
in terms of the behaviour of the monetary authority. However, there is no consensus on this.
One interpretation of probing is that it entails optimal learning, that is, following a more
aggressive policy to learn about the parameters of the economy. Probing of this type results
in more precise estimates, and therefore smaller policy mistakes in future periods. Building
on Wieland’s (1998) analysis of this issue, I consider a simple calibrated model in the
Canadian context and examine the relationship between this deﬁnition of probing and
credibility.
Monetary authorities have put signiﬁcant emphasis on attaining credibility for their
policy objectives in recent years. Steps taken by the Bank of Canada have included
announcingexplicitinﬂationtargets,publishingdetailedaccountsofinﬂationdevelopments
and the conduct ofmonetary policy, and issuingpress releases explaining changes in the
1. See Thiessen (1995) or Poole (1998) for discussions of the various dimensions of uncertainty
facing monetary authorities.
2. See Kuttner (1992), Laxton and Tetlow (1992), Butler (1996), St-Amant and van Norden
(1997), or Dupasquier, Guay, and St-Amant (1999) for a discussion of the various ways
potential output is measured.3
Bank Rate.3 These steps have increased the accountability of the monetary authority and
that, together with the realized inﬂation record, has enhanced its credibility in the sense that
expectations ofinﬂation have become more ﬁrmly anchored tothe inﬂation target.4
The question addressed here is whether an increase in credibility increases the
desirability of probing. In other words, should a monetary authority that has increased its
credibility follow a more aggressive policy in order to obtain more precise estimates of the
parameters of the economy? I ﬁnd that, for plausible parameter values, the optimal amount
of probing is small and varies little with credibility. It is only for low levels of credibility or
unrealisticallylargeamountsofuncertaintyorvolatilitythattheoptimalpolicywithprobing
diverges signiﬁcantly from a policy that ignores learning. Even then, the optimal amount of
probing diminishes as credibility rises.
At an intuitive level, the returns to probing decrease as credibility increases in the
modelIconsiderbecausecredibilitymakeslearningmoredifﬁcult.Ascredibilityincreases,
inﬂation becomes more ﬁrmly anchored to the inﬂation target; thus the out-turn for inﬂation
islessinformativeaboutpotentialoutput.Toillustratethiswithanexample,supposethatthe
monetary authority is underestimating potential output and, as a result, incorrectly believes
that the economy is operating at potential. With low credibility, inﬂation will lie below the
target, allowing the monetary authority to infer that its estimate of potential was incorrect.
Athigherlevelsofcredibility,inﬂationismoreﬁrmlyanchoredtothetarget,sothatinﬂation
provides a weaker signal that potential output is higher than was previously believed.
The next section summarizes the literature supporting a conservative monetary
policy in the face of uncertainty regarding the economy. Section 3 summarizes articles
arguingforamoreaggressivepolicy.AnoutlineofthemodelisgiveninSection4,followed
by discussion of the parameter values in Section 5 and results in Section 6. Conclusions
follow in Section 7.
2. Uncertainty and conservatism
Anumberofauthors,startingwithBrainard(1967),arguethatuncertaintyisamotivatorfor
a conservative monetarypolicy. Brainard considersa simple model given by
, (1)
3. See Amano, Coletti, and Macklem (1998) for more details.
4. See Johnson (1997, 1998) or Perrier (1998) for evidence of this.
ya p u + =4
where the objective of the policy-maker is to choose the value of the policy variable that
minimizes the value of the policy-maker’s loss function, . Under certainty, the
optimal policy takes the form of
, (2)
and the policy-maker achieves the objective. Uncertainty can enter into this problem in two
differentways:additiveuncertainty,viathevalueof ;ormultiplicativeuncertainty,viathe
value of .
In the presence of uncertainty, the policy-maker seeks to minimize the expected




not change the optimal policy response.
In the presence of multiplicative uncertainty, the optimal policy departs from the
certaintyequivalentpolicy,sincethevarianceof aswellasthecovarianceof and now
enter into the policy inthe following way:
. (4)
In the special case that and , the optimal policy rule reduces to
. (5)
Since is positive, the optimal policy response to shocks is smaller, or more conservative,
than the certainty equivalent policy.
Other authors obtain similar results in a variety of frameworks. Aoki (1998)
considers the effect of measurement errors on optimal monetary policy. He models the
manner in which the central bank extracts information about economic shocks from noisy
indicators using a dynamic sticky-price model. He shows that the central bank should
respond to its forecasts of both the current output gap and current inﬂation, even if it is
concerned only about inﬂation (as in the Taylor rule), although its response should be
cautious due tothe presenceof measurementerror.
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Svensson (1998) model in which the Taylor rule is non-optimal. He assumes that the output
gap is measured with error, so that additive uncertainty is present in the model. As in the
Brainard example, optimal central bank behaviour is not affected by this uncertainty.
However, if the central bank were to restrict itself to using a Taylor rule to formulate policy,




other contributions, Srour (1999) extends his framework to an open economy context and
obtains the same result, although the degree of conservatism is not great for plausible
parameter values.
In some models, the NAIRU (Non Accelerating Inﬂation Rate of Unemployment)
may serve the same role for monetary policy purposes as potential output. Estrella and
Mishkin (1998) consider the impact of uncertainty in the NAIRU on optimal monetary
policy in a simple linear model. They show that uncertainty of this type has no effect on the
optimal policy, but uncertainty as to the trade-off between unemployment and inﬂation
results in a more conservativeoptimal policy.
Bean(1999)studiestheimplicationsofaconvexPhillipscurveontheoptimalpolicy
under uncertainty. The optimal policy displays conservatism, and output is less than
potential on average. In contrast to Brainard (1967), however, the presence of uncertainty
here leads to a systematic bias in policy: policy should always be set tighter than it would be
in the absence of uncertainty.5
Sack (1998) argues that the central bank is conﬁdent about the relationship between
output and monetary policy if policy remains close to recent levels, but less conﬁdent as it
movesaway from levels implementedin the recent past. He assumed an I.S.curve given by
, (6)
5. Alternatively, a systematically tight monetary policy may result from a linear Phillips curve if
policy-makers think credibility (that is, the degree with which inﬂation expectations are
anchoredtothetarget)isdifﬁculttoattainbuteasytolose.Thishastheeffectofincreasingthe
potential costs of expanding the economy too quickly relative to the costs of a recession, and
so leads to a less expansionary policy than would be optimal without uncertainty. See Laxton,
Ricketts, and Rose (1994) for an example of this.
yt 1 + at 1 + ft 1 + it – =6
where is the policy instrument while and , a measure of policy effectiveness, evolve
through time. The variance of output is increasing in changes to the policy variable, so that
the optimal policy entails gradual adjustment over time. These gradual changes provide
informative observations about the effect of policy and the value of parameters in the
economy andthereby reduce uncertainty about the impact of futurepolicy.
In all of the above cases, uncertainty results in a more conservative optimal policy.
The next sectionoutlines frameworks in whichuncertainty may lead toprobing.
3. Uncertainty and probing
A number of authors provide frameworks where the optimal policy of a central bank entails
some probing or experimenting. For example, Caplin and Leahy (1996) suggest that policy-
makers learn about the economy by observing the economy’s response to policy shocks.
When the economy is operating below potential, the aim of the central bank is to stimulate
output via lowering interest rates to the point where some (but not all) planned investment
projectswillbeundertaken.Theyarguethatsmalldecreasesintheinterestratemayresultin
little economic response, as agents will (correctly) infer that future reductions in interest
rates are likely to follow. Proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms defer investment projects that are
proﬁtable at current interest rates until those rates fall further. As a result, both the length of
recessions and the amount of policy adjustment required to attain potential output may be
larger if the policy is changed graduallythan if it is changedrapidly.
An alternative view of probing, and the one that is used here, assumes that policy-
makers use the latest available data to estimate the parameters of the economy each period.
Thesenewestimatesarethenusedinpolicyformulation.Ifpolicy-makersignoretheimpact
of their policy on this learning process, the policy-makers are said to be engaged in “passive
learning.” Alternatively, if the policy-maker explicitly takes account of the impact of their
policy on the learning process, the policy-maker is engaged in “active learning” or
“probing.”
As a simple illustration, consider the example of Brainard given in (EQ 1) above.
Suppose that the policy-maker regresses on each period and uses this regression to
update the estimate of . The optimal policy of the monetary authority will then take
account of the amount of information generated by the policy. In general, the optimal policy




(EQ 5), but less aggressive than the certainty equivalent policy (EQ 3). As will be outlined
below, other authors obtain similarresults with more general models.
Bertocchi andSpagat (1993) model the economy withthe following equation:
, (7)
where the policy-maker seeks to control with . The parameters and change
every period and are randomly distributed with joint distribution . Policy-makers learn
about this distribution by experimenting. The authors ﬁnd that the optimal policy
incorporates some experimentation.
Kendrick (1982) considers the potential for learning within a model that contained
10 unknown (constant) parameters. He ﬁnds that costly experimentation is desirable, and
that increased model complexity increases the amount of costly experimentation that is
optimal.
There have been examples in history where a major structural change in the
economy has resulted in the central bank having little reliable data with which to inform
their policy decisions. One such example was the German reuniﬁcation in 1990. Wieland
(1996) conducts dynamic simulations of monetary policy decisions in a model calibrated to
the German economy at that time. Wieland shows that passive learning by the central bank
could have resulted in persistent deviations from policy objectives since some policies yield
littleornoinformationaboutthestateoftheeconomy.Incontrast,apolicythatincorporates
active learningeliminatedpersistent policy mistakes.
The basic premise behind these learning models is that the policy-maker lacks the
data required to construct accurate estimates of the model parameters, despite the fact that
the parameters remain constant over time. However, except when there are major structural
changes to the economy (such as immediately following reuniﬁcation in Germany), the
main source of uncertainty facing the monetary authority is more likely to be related to the
evolution ofthe economy than the lack ofdata, asBean (1999, 15)notes:
In practise the main source of uncertainty is ... not due to the imprecision
with which parameters are estimated as a result of econometricians having
limited sample information. Rather, a stochastic, or at best evolving,
parameter model seems more appropriate in which learning about the value
of today’s parameters is of distinctly limited value for knowing their future
value.
yt ya t btMt et ++ + =
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Further, these types of active learning models do not provide an explanation for the
behaviour that may be observed in practice. For example, in the United States in the mid-
1990s, monetary policy remained stimulative even after many economists believed that
potential output had been attained. As a result, it was discovered that potential output was
greaterthanhadpreviouslybeenbelieved.Probinginpractice,ifittakesplaceatall,appears
to exist only at the point where the central bank perceives that it is getting close to full
employment.Probingofthetypediscussedaboveshouldbejustasvaluablewhenthepolicy
agency is far from full employment aswhen it is near.
Another class of learning models utilize an economy that evolves through time. For
example, Balvers and Cosimano (1994) assume that the link between money growth and
inﬂationistime-varyinganduncertain.Inparticular, ,whereboth and
follow an AR(1) process. Over time, the policy-maker learns about the parameters. The
authors assume that anticipated inﬂation has little cost, while unanticipated inﬂation is
costly. As a result, policy-makers seek to minimize the variability of inﬂation. High money
growth leads to high inﬂation and also high inﬂation variability, since a large implies a
high multiplier on the unknown parameter . The optimal policy is therefore one with zero
money growth. Balvers and Cosimano use a dynamic programming framework to compute
the optimal policy path. They assess the impact of taking into account learning with the
“myopic” policy (when the beneﬁts of learning about the parameters are ignored in the
policy formulation process) and the “cold-turkey” policy (when money supply growth is
immediately set to zero). They ﬁnd that the optimal policy entails a signiﬁcantly faster
reduction in monetary growth than the myopic policy, but one that is slower than the cold-
turkey policy.
Wieland (1998) considers the impact on policy of uncertainty as to the natural
unemploymentrate,inamodelverysimilartotheonewewillexaminebelow.Thetrade-off
between inﬂation andunemployment follows a standard Phillips curve,
, (8)
where the natural unemployment rate follows a random walk and . The
monetary authority faces the following minimization problem:
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. (9)
The monetary authority does not know the values of or , but must estimate them with
available data.
Wieland ﬁnds that in a static framework, a conservative policy is optimal. However,
in a dynamic framework where the monetary authority takes explicit account of the impact
of their policy on the amount of learning they can accomplish, the optimal policy lies
between the static and the certainty equivalent policies. The only exception to this is when
there is a very high degree of uncertainty, and inﬂation is close to the target. Then, the
optimal policy with learning is more extreme than the static policy. This is consistent with
recent experience inthe United States, as outlinedabove.
Taking an entirely different approach, Isard and Laxton (1998) consider a model
calibrated to the Australian economy in which experimentation only occurs when inﬂation
islowinanattemptbythemonetaryauthoritytobetteridentifythe(unknown,time-varying)
NAIRU. They incorporate endogenous credibility, so that probing may result in long-term
costs for the monetary authority and a convex Phillips curve. While a probing policy may
resultinaslightlyloweraveragerateofunemploymentintheirframework,thisoccursatthe
expense of a risein average inﬂation rates.
Finally, Stock (1999) argues that time-varying parameters make the use of robust
control desirable. He considers a simple linear model of the United States where the
parameters follow random walks, and the monetary authority chooses policy utilizing the
minimax criterion. He ﬁnds that, for some types of uncertainty, policies should be more
aggressive than point-estimateswould suggest.
Ingeneral,the literatureexaminedhere suggeststhat thebeneﬁts toactively probing
in a bid to determine the level of potential output are typically small. The only circumstance
whentheoptimal“learning”policyismoreaggressivethanthecertaintyequivalentpolicyis
when output is close to potential, and the monetary authority faces an extremely high
amount of uncertainty(Wieland 1998).
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Intheremainderofthispaper,therelationshipbetweencredibilityandthebeneﬁtsto
probing is examined. In an economy in which there are explicit inﬂation targets, such as
Canada’s, the question addressed is whether probing is more desirable when people believe
those targets will be attained than when they do not.
4. The model
The economy considered here is similar to that outlined in Wieland (1998), but with the
Phillips curve deﬁned interms ofoutput rather than unemployment,
, (10)
where is a price shock.
The central bank does not know the value of potential output, , which follows a
random walk: .6 They also do not know the slope of the Phillips curve,
(assumed constant), and so must learn about each of these over time. Clearly, there are also
manyothersourcesofuncertaintythatenterintotheproblemofsettingmonetarypolicythat
are ignored here;all other parameters are assumed known by the monetary authority.




The estimates of and from this regression are then used to form an estimate of
given by
, (12)
which is used in the formulation of monetary policy in the following period. Monetary
policy entails the setting of the real interest rate, which inﬂuences real output according to
the relation
. (13)
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Forsimplicity,thereisnouncertaintyinthisrelationship:themonetaryauthoritycanalways
attain a desired level of output via an appropriate choice of in this model, subject to the
constraint that nominalinterest rates cannot be negative.7
Inﬂation expectations are a weighted mean of the target and lagged inﬂation,
, (14)
where is a measure of credibility. If , then inﬂation expectations are equal
tolastperiod’sinﬂationrate,whileif ,inﬂationexpectationsareequaltotheinﬂation
target ofthe central bank.8,9
The monetaryauthority seeks tominimize its loss given by
, (15)
where is the discount rate. represents a monetary authority that cares only about
inﬂation deviations from target, while for , the monetary authority cares only about
deviationsof output from potential.
In a one-period world with certainty, the optimal real interest rate would be set according to
the rule
, (16)
subject tothe restriction that the nominal interestrate cannot be negative
. (17)
This is analogous to (EQ 3) in the Brainard case above, and will be referred to as the
“certainty equivalent” policy for the remainder of the paper. An increase in central banker
credibility (measured as an increase in ) has the effect of reducing the optimal policy
7. It would be possible to include a demand shock term in (EQ 13), although in this model it is
exactly equivalent to a shock to potential output. The monetary authority is concerned about
thevalueoftheoutputgap,anduncertaintyastoeithercomponentofthatgapisidenticalfrom
their standpoint. If demand shocks were not permanent (that is, the coefﬁcient on lagged
output in (EQ 13) did not equal 1), then the effect of a demand shock would diverge from a
potential shock.
8. is assumed known by the monetary authority. Srour (1999) showed that uncertainty about
the propagation of inﬂation (in this framework, uncertainty about level of credibility) leads to
a more aggressive policy response being appropriate.
9. With , the model isequivalent to Wieland (1998).
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response toadeviationofthe inﬂation ratefromtarget. Inﬂationexpectations (and therefore
future inﬂation rates) are less sensitive to current inﬂation at higher levels of credibility, so
that the optimal policy is less aggressive in responding to current variation in inﬂation, all
other things being equal.
If the central bank were to explicitly allow for the impact of uncertainty on the
optimal policy ina static environment, that policy wouldbe set according tothe rule
(18)
again subjectto the restriction that nominal interest ratescannot be negative (EQ 17).
This is analogous to (EQ 4) in the Brainard example above and will be referred to as
the “conservative” policy for the remainder of the paper. The additional term in the policy
rule may be positive or negative and, for some economic shocks, may result in a more
aggressive policy response than the certainty equivalent policy. Its presence is somewhat
counterintuitive, as Wieland (1998, 15)explains:
It implies that even in a situation where the observed inﬂation rate is on
target and [output] equals [estimated potential output], the central bank
would pursue a policy that drives [output] away from estimated [potential
output] in expectation.
Hegoesontoexplainthattheﬁnaltermisafunctionofestimatesbasedonhistorical
data and captures the idea that, with uncertainty, it is optimal for a central bank to lean
towards the historical mean of output rather than seeking to end an inﬂationary or
disinﬂationary period abruptly.10 In general, (EQ 18) implies a more conservative policy
response to shocks than (EQ 16).
Note that the difference between these two policies diminishes as the weight on
output increases in the central bank’s loss function and in the limit, as , the policies
converge and do notvary withcredibility. Forextreme values of (that is, ),
10. See Wieland (1998, 15–18) for a more complete discussion.
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these policies are also optimal in a multi-period world where there is no learning. When the
monetaryauthoritytargetsonlyinﬂationoroutput,thereisnotrade-offbetweenmeetingthe
target this period and next. For , the extent to which meeting the inﬂation and
output targets this period precludes meeting the inﬂation target next period varies with
credibility. As a result, the optimal dynamic policy without learning diverges from the
optimal static policy. As an example of the impact of this, the analogue of (EQ 16) for the
certaintyequivalentinterestrateintheﬁrstperiodofaworldthatlastsfortwoperiodsandin
which the monetary authority targets both inﬂation and output is given by
.
(EQ 19)
We will use this policy rule later to see if varying impacts the optimal amount of
probing that the monetaryauthority should undertake.
We now consider a multi-period world in which the monetary authority learns over
time. Each period, their estimates of and are updated optimally using the new data
obtained. In a world with constant parameters, this would involve Bayesian updating.
Because istime-varyinghere,theappropriateanaloguetoBayesianupdatingthatresults






The optimal policy that takes account of the learning process and optimizes the
amount of learning is now the solution to a highly non-linear problem that cannot be solved
analytically. Other authorsresort tocomputationally intensive techniquesin order to
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approximate the optimal policy.11 Here, the economy is simulated under varying degrees of
policy credibility to determine the degree of aggressiveness that is warranted in the face of a
desirebythecentralbanktominimiselosswhenlearningabouttheeconomyisendogenous
to the model.
For tractability reasons, the economy is assumed to have a ﬁnite life. In an economy
withonlyoneperiod,theoptimalpolicywithactivelearningcoincideswiththeconservative
policy,sincethereisnotimeforthemonetaryauthoritytobeneﬁtfrominformationobtained
in the ﬁrst period. With two periods, these policies differ only in the ﬁrst period. In reality,
the beneﬁts from learning accrue in all future periods, and not just the period immediately
following. Therefore, an economy with a life of two periods provides a lower bound on the
beneﬁts ofactive policy.
To further examine the beneﬁts of active learning, an economy with a life of
10 periods is also considered. An optimizing monetary authority may be expected to
undertake active learning in every period except the ﬁnal one. However, because a grid
search is used to determine this policy, it would be computationally demanding to allow for
active learning in more than one period. Active learning is therefore restricted to the ﬁrst
periodonly;thereafter,themonetaryauthorityfollowsaconservativepolicyandalllearning
is passive. Examining both a 2-period and a 10-period economy allows us to assess the
sensitivity ofthe results to the length chosen.
5. Parameter values
Clearly the results obtained from this exercise are somewhat dependant upon the choice of
parameter values. Here the values chosen are outlined, as well as the reasons for choosing
them. In general, parameter values are consistent with recent studies using Canadian data,
interpreting the model at an annual frequency. Further, it is assumed that the central bank
knowshowmuchitdoesnotknow.Thatis,ifthebankdoesnotknowaparametervalue,then
it knows the distribution fromwhich that parameter is drawn.
The loss function of the monetary authority is characterized by the following
parameters:aninﬂationtargetof2percent(thatis, );arateoftimepreferenceof
0.95; and pure inﬂation targeting: . The optimal policy with pure output targeting
11. Forexample,Wieland(1998)usesadynamicprogrammingalgorithmthatprovidesnumerical
approximations tothe solution for the special case when potential output isconstant.
p* 0.02 =
w 0.0 =15
( ) was also considered, but this was identical to the policy that ignores learning. In
reality, a central bank is likely to care about both the output gap and the inﬂation gap, an
issue that will be addressed alittle later.
Thestandarddeviationoftheerrorintheinﬂationprocessis ,or per
cent on an annual basis. This is consistent with total variability of inﬂation over the past
10 years. Thestandarddeviationofshocks to potentialoutput is taken fromKichian (1999),
who measures potential output in a state-space framework: , or 0.4 per cent of
the level of potential output.
Real interest rates at time zero are taken to be consistent with a nominal interest rate
of5percentandinﬂationexpectationsof2percent: ;initialrealoutputisthelog
of output inmillions of dollars: ; and inﬂationat timezero is .
It is assumed that the central bank believes the economy to be in excess supply at
time 0,12 with chosen consistent with the belief of the central bank being incorrect
(and the economy actually being in excess demand) 45, 15, and 1 per cent of the time
respectively. That is, where (for the former case)
corresponds to the score in the standard normal distribution associated with 45 per cent of
the upper tail being greater than . The 45 per cent case may be thought of as high initial
uncertainty as to the level of potential output, with the 1 per cent case corresponding to low
initial uncertainty.
The initial level of potential output, , is chosen at random from the normal
distribution that is centred on the monetary authority’s expectation of potential output, and
has a variance consistent with the belief of the central bank. That is,
where . The variance is chosen consistent with the variance found in
estimates of the level of potential output in recent years: . The impact
of real interest rates on output is consistent with estimates obtained by Duguay (1994):
.
At time zero, the monetary authority believes that the slope of the Phillips curve is
, which is consistent with a sacriﬁce ratio of 2 when the monetary authority
has no credibility.13 The value of is chosen to be consistent with this:
12. This assumption does not limit the applicability of the results. The optimal policy when the
monetary authority believes it is facing an excess demand will be the mirror image of that
obtained here.
13. Recent estimates of the sacriﬁce ratio for Canada include 1.5 (Dupasquier and Girouard
1992), 1.7 (Duguay 1994), and 2.2 (Fillion and Léonard 1997).
w¥ =
se 0.006 = 0.6
sh 0.004 =
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y0 13.7 = p0 0.015 =
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. The true value of is drawn from a distribution that is centred
on the monetary authority’s expectations, so that , where
, and . The Bank’s initial estimates of and
are chosen to beconsistent with and :
,
. (21)
The economy is simulated with varying degrees of central bank credibility
( ). In every period, the monetary authority updates their estimates of , , their
variances and covariance, and uses these new estimates in the selection of policy. Certainty
equivalent and conservative “passive learning” policies are constructed for all periods. A
gridsearchisthenusedtoﬁndtheﬁrstperiodinterestratethatminimizestheexpectedvalue
of the monetary authority’s losses over 10,000 artiﬁcial runs of the future, assuming a
conservative policy for all periods following the ﬁrst period. This will converge to the
optimal active learning policy asthe samplesize increases.14
6. Results
In analyzing the results, there are several important matters to bear in mind. First, the initial
real interest rate is 3 per cent, so all interest rates should be compared with this. Second, the
central bank believes that the economy is initially in excess supply and knows the
probability with which that belief is correct. And third, only two sources of parameter
uncertainty have been incorporated in the model: uncertainty as to the level of potential
output, and uncertainty as to the slope of the Phillips curve. There are many other sources of
uncertainty, which would lead to a greater difference between the certainty equivalent and
conservative policies and wouldalso likely increase the potential gains toprobing.15
14. By deﬁnition, the optimal policy in a one-period world (when there are no beneﬁts to probing)
isgivenby (EQ17).Experimentationrevealedthat10,000runsweresufﬁcienttoensurethatthe
simulated optimal policy equals the theoretical optimal policy to six decimal places for the
formulations of the model considered here.
15. For example, the monetary authority may face uncertainty as to whether the Phillips curve is
linear or not, or be unsure of the value of other parameters in the economy, which may also be
evolving over time.
E0 a0 () E0 b () E0 y0* () = b
b E0 b () e b + =
eb N 0 V0 b () , () ~ V0 b () 0.05 ()
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C0 a0 b , () V0 b () V0 y0* ()
V0 a0 () E0 b () ()
2V0 y0* ()y0* ()
2
V0 b () V0 y0* () V0 b () ++ =
C0 a0 b , () V0 b () y0* =
0 l 1 ££ a t b17
The policy based on (EQ16) is labelled the certainty equivalent policy, (EQ18) the
conservative policy, and the simulated policy that incorporates an optimal amount of
learningthe activelearning policy.
First consider simulations 1 to 3, the results of which are given in Table 1 and
Figure 1.Highinitialuncertainty(simulation1)referstoaneconomywheretheinitialpoint
estimates of the monetary authority indicate a state of excess supply at time 0, but the initial
variance estimates indicate a 45 per cent probability of being wrong. For moderate and low
uncertainty (simulations 2 and 3),these percentages are 15 and 1 respectively.
The certainty equivalent policy is slightly more aggressive than the conservative
policy, although as credibility increases, the extent to which they differ diminishes. The
optimal policy with active learning is more aggressive than the alternative policies at low
levels of credibility, but becomes less aggressive as credibility rises. In the recent past,
monetary policy in Canada has generally adjusted in 25-basis-point increments. Except at
low levels of credibility, the effect of active learning on policy is always much less than one
increment. Also, the impact of uncertainty (that is, the difference between the certainty
equivalent policy and the conservative policy) is not large. Even the difference between an
economy with a life of two periods and one with 10 periods is negligible, except at very low
levels ofcredibility.
The results of simulation 3 yield the greatest difference in policy caused by active
learning. This is the situation where the monetary authority has an extremely good initial
information set and is almost certain that the economy is in excess supply. Under these
circumstances, a monetary authority with little credibility should run a more aggressive
monetarypolicy in order to learnoptimally about the parametersof the economy.
Next, more extreme parameter variability was considered under moderate
uncertainty, to examine the robustness of this result (see Figure 2). In simulation 4, the
standard deviation of innovations in the Phillips curve ( ) was increased by a factor of 5,
while in simulations 5 through 7, (the standard deviation of innovations to potential
output), (the initial standard deviation of potential output), and (the
initial standard deviation of the slope of the Phillips curve) were increased by factors of 5
respectively.16
16. Toavoidthenominalinterestbound( ),simulation6wasconductedassuminganinitial
real interest rate of 10 per cent.
se
sh
V0 y0* () V0 b ()
rt pt
e – ³18
Increased inﬂation shock volatility (simulation 4) results in an optimal learning
policy that is substantially more aggressive than alternative policies, although the extent of
thisdeclinesascredibilityrises.Atlowlevelsofcredibility,theoptimalnominalinterestrate
is equal to close to its lower bound, and even with moderate levels of credibility, the
differences are still signiﬁcantly greater than 25 basis points. Very similar results are also
obtainedforincreasedpotentialoutputshockvolatility(simulation5).Increaseduncertainty
about the initial level of potential output (simulation 6) produces qualitatively similar
results,althoughthemagnitudeofthedifferenceinpoliciesissmaller.Incontrast,increased
uncertainty as to the value of (simulation 7) drives a wedge between the certainty
equivalent andconservative policies, with the optimal learningpolicy lying betweenthese.
These results indicate that probing may be beneﬁcial for a monetary authority with
lowormoderatecredibilityiftheeconomyisexperiencinglargeinﬂationorpotentialoutput
shocks or if the monetary authority has very poor information about the level of potential
output. However, increased uncertainty about the slope of the Phillips curve does not
warrant much change in the optimal policy in order tolearn.
Finally, a two-period world in which both output and inﬂation are targeted was
considered, with parameter values set equal to those considered in simulation 1 (see Figure
3). As noted in Section 4, this adds signiﬁcant complexity to the problem. The certainty
equivalentpolicyfortheﬁrstperiodisobtainedfrom (EQ19),andforthesecondperiodfrom
(EQ 16). The conservative and active learning policies for the ﬁrst period are both obtained
usingsimulationmethods.Fortheconservativepolicy,thepolicythatminimizesﬁrstperiod
loss is appropriate, while for the active learning policy, the policy that minimizes combined
ﬁrst and second period losses is appropriate, where the interest rate in the second period is
set accordingto (EQ 18).
With a small weight on deviations of output from potential, there is little change
from the results already described. However, if deviations of output from potential are
weighted equally in percentage terms with deviations of inﬂation from target ( ;
simulation 9), there is a divergence between the conservative policy and the certainty
equivalent policy, with the optimal learning policy almost indistinguishable from the latter.
Once again, as credibility rises, this divergence diminishes. Finally, if the monetary
authority places very little weight on inﬂation deviations from the target (simulation 11),






model of the Canadian economy, where probing is interpreted as following a more
aggressive policy in order to learn about the parameters of the economy. The optimal
amount of probing for a monetary authority that seeks to target inﬂation has been shown to
be generally small, and to vary little with credibility. Only with low levels of credibility or
unrealistically large levels of uncertainty or volatility does the optimal policy with probing
diverge by more than one policy increment (25 basis points) from a policy that ignores
learning. Even then, for most forms of uncertainty, the optimal amount of probing
diminishes ascredibility rises.
The results also suggest that the optimal amount of probing decreases with
credibility because of the positive impact increased credibility plays in reducing output and
inﬂation volatility in the economy. The monetary authority’s estimated equation (EQ 11)
effectively equates the inﬂation gap (inﬂation less expectations) with the output gap. At
higher levels of credibility, these gaps are small on average and increasingly
indistinguishable from the shock terms. The information contained in a new observation is
small under such circumstances, and the monetary authority’s estimates do not change very
muchovertimewhetherthemonetaryauthoritychoosestoprobeornot.Incontrast,atlower
levels of credibility, there will generally be signiﬁcant inﬂation and output gaps, with larger
improvements in the precision of the monetary authority’s estimates from one period to the
next. The informational beneﬁts from probing are therefore greatest at low levels of
credibility, resulting in a negative relationship between the optimal amount of probing and
the level of credibility enjoyed by the monetaryauthority.
There are several limitations to this analysis. First, credibility is assumed to be
known by the monetary authority and is independent of policy. In reality, a monetary
authority cannot be sure of the amount of credibility it enjoys, and the act of probing may
result in reduced credibility.
Second, the scope of uncertainty is this model is very limited. The monetary
authority is uncertain only about the level of potential output and the slope of the Phillips
curve. The reality facing policy-makers is that uncertainty is considerably more pervasive.
Inthissetting,thebeneﬁtstoprobingmaybelarger,althoughthisremainstobeestablished.
Third,theinitialestimationerrorsthemonetaryauthoritymakesinestimating and
are independent of each other. In general, these estimates will be negatively correlated
b
y0*20
so that an overestimate of the slope of the Phillips curve will imply an underestimate of the
output gap.
Fourth, inﬂation has no impact on output in this model, and so aside from entering
the loss function of the monetary authority, has no cost to the economy. Therefore, the level
ofcredibilitydoesnotinﬂuencethepolicythatisrequiredtoattainanoutputtarget,although
it hasa substantial effect on the policy that is requiredto attain an inﬂation target.
Finally, these results may be sensitive to the interpretation of probing considered.
Isard and Laxton (1998) develop an alternative view of probing in which probing only
occurs when inﬂationis low, and credibility is endogenous.21







10 Period 2 Period
Simulation 1
High Initial Uncertainty About Potential
0.0 0.01937 0.01947 0.01926 0.01911
0.2 0.02138 0.02145 0.02139 0.02131
0.4 0.02338 0.02343 0.02342 0.02336
0.6 0.02538 0.02541 0.02539 0.02534
0.8 0.02738 0.02739 0.02737 0.02731
1.0 0.02938 0.02938 0.02935 0.02929
Simulation 2
ModerateInitial Uncertainty About Potential
0.0 0.01482 0.01492 0.01416 0.01442
0.2 0.01682 0.01690 0.01670 0.01665
0.4 0.01882 0.01880 0.01891 0.01879
0.6 0.02082 0.02086 0.02083 0.02078
0.8 0.02282 0.02284 0.02281 0.02276
1.0 0.02482 0.02482 0.02472 0.02474
Simulation 3
Low InitialUncertainty About Potential
0.0 0.00837 0.00846 0.00629 0.00740
0.2 0.01037 0.01044 0.00981 0.00995
0.4 0.01237 0.01242 0.01205 0.01231
0.6 0.01437 0.01440 0.01438 0.01432
0.8 0.01637 0.01638 0.01636 0.01630
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